The WAB transforms Boris Johnson`s withdrawal agreement, which is a draft international treaty, into British law and gives the government permission to ratify it. The limited control of the WAB is, to some extent, the product of institutional design and not of government decision-making. From the beginning of the Brexit process, it was foreseeable that the CSF review would be deficient. This was for two main reasons. The first is that the bill will not be introduced and Parliament will only move forward once the Withdrawal Agreement has been concluded and politically agreed. This means that the room for manoeuvre for amendments in Parliament was reduced by the fact that the Treaty was concluded, but more importantly, the political conditions of the debate would mean that there would be little appetite or time for constructive consideration. The second is the absence of parliamentary procedures or constitutional provisions to structure the participation of parliamentarians in the negotiation of an international agreement such as the Withdrawal Agreement. After the entry into force of the MAP, the Withdrawal Agreement must also be ratified by the European Parliament. The October WAB contained a provision (clause 31) that would have set up a structure for Parliament to monitor negotiations on the EU`s future relationship.
This provision, for example by seeking the approval of MPs for the government`s negotiating mandate, could have led to increased scrutiny of parliamentary committees. The decision not to include Term 31 in the CEF indicates that the government does not want to be bound by legal requirements to obtain the agreement of the House of Commons at certain stages of the negotiations. From the point of view of the rule of law, this seems short-sighted. Article 31 has provided a means of increasing transparency and accessibility of the UK Government`s role in formulating the future relationship, an international agreement that will have a profound impact on the people of the UK. In the absence of such a provision, Parliament and the government must find other mechanisms to ensure that parliamentarians and the public can be involved in the review of international agreements. Then, the course of Brexit will be set on January 31, when the transition phase after Brexit will begin. This article was originally published on 21 October and has been updated to reflect the changes made to the Withdrawal Agreement and its passage into law. Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom, OJ L 347, 28.7.2000, p.
1. C 34 31.01.19, p. 1-16 If the government wants to prioritise immediate divergence in the next stage of Brexit, it will be important for the rule of law that the government maintains a balanced approach to both the process and the content of the revision of the Constitution. . . .